Episode 148: US China relations in the 1970s

[00:00:00] Benjamin: This is 15 Minute History, a podcast for educators, students, and anyone interested in history, featuring the minds and voices of the University of Texas at Austin.

[00:00:26] Benjamin: In the first two decades after World War II, relations between the US and China were at an all time low. All this changed in the 1970s. President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, and in 1979 diplomatic relations were normalized. What led to this transformation? Traditional diplomatic history takes a top down approach to this question.

[00:00:49] Benjamin: Today’s guest does not. Kazushi Minami is the author of People’s Diplomacy, which focuses less on the architects of foreign policy and more on the artisans, specifically [00:01:00] Americans and Chinese from all walks of life who engaged in people to people exchanges across the realms of business, culture, and sport.

[00:01:09] Benjamin: Menami argues that these exchanges were crucial in how Americans reimagined China as a country of opportunities. Meanwhile, Chinese reinterpreted the U. S. as an agent of modernization, capable of enriching their country. Menami teaches history at Osaka University in his native Japan. He earned his doctorate in history from UT Austin.

[00:01:30] Benjamin: Kazushi, welcome to 15 minute history. Thank you for having me, Ben. So when I think of diplomatic history, I think of diplomats. I think of politicians. I think of smoke filled war rooms full of men making decisions on behalf of everybody else. You have a very different take on diplomatic history.

[00:01:55] Kazushi: Yeah, um, so diplomatic history used to be, um, [00:02:00] the way you just described, uh, that way, right?

[00:02:03] Kazushi: Completely focused upon high level politicians, diplomats, presidents, generals, et cetera, et cetera. Uh, in the past quarter century or so, um, diplomatic historians diversified into different approaches, um, trying to combine social history, cultural history, uh, and military history and diplomatic history. Um, so my fellow Japanese Iriya Akira was one of the pioneers in this area.

[00:02:29] Kazushi: Um, this approach has not been tested, um, that much in U. S. China relations during the Cold War. And this is understandable because in the 1950s and 60s, the United States and China were Cold War enemies fighting over many parts of the world, including Korea. Taiwan and Vietnam, they virtually had no contacts with each other, although there were some people, including some radical African Americans who traveled to [00:03:00] China.

[00:03:00] Kazushi: So, uh, when Cold War historians research, um, U. S. China relations. Uh, in the 1950s and 60s, they, you know, naturally focused on high level policymakers, but everything changes in the 1970s, president Richard Nixon visited China in February, 1972. And seven years later, um, the United States and China would normalize diplomatic relations, uh, in the past.

[00:03:23] Kazushi: Uh, U. S. China relations could be described as the relationship between the two governments, uh, but, uh, in the 1970s, the, the substance of U. S. China relations started to change, and we see an aggregate of relationships, plural, uh, created not just by policymakers, but also by a host of different actors, people from all walks of life, uh, including business people, scientists, students, tourists.

[00:03:49] Kazushi: athletes, artists, what have you, uh, and they would create, uh, this, uh, a really, uh, diverse, complex and impactful, uh, relationship between [00:04:00] the two countries.

[00:04:01] Benjamin: I think one of the phrases you use is you’ve got the architects of the, of US, uh, China relations, but then you’ve got the carpenters as well. And so can you, can you describe some of these carpenters to us, who they are?

[00:04:15] Benjamin: Uh, what they do,

[00:04:17] Kazushi: how

[00:04:17] Benjamin: they get there.

[00:04:19] Kazushi: Um, so the architects, um, by which I meant that, uh, the policymakers in the United States and China, whether it’s Richard Nixon or Henry Kissinger or Mao Zedong or Zhong Enlai, uh, they set the framework. So, uh, everything started, um, from, uh, their agreements to start. Uh, what they call the people, the people exchanges in different fields.

[00:04:43] Kazushi: So they set the framework, but they could not manage everything, uh, because the magnitude of these exchange programs were so huge. So they relegated, uh, these activities to non state actors. Uh, the biggest among them, among these organizations being [00:05:00] the, uh, national committee on the U S China relations, uh, which is still a prominent organization in this realm.

[00:05:06] Benjamin: So just to back up there, these organizations, they’re not necessarily state funded or state ran, but they are state encouraged. Is that a good way to put it?

[00:05:17] Kazushi: Yeah, exactly. So it’s, uh, you know, the relationship between these, um, U S organizations and the U S government, but sometimes, um, not very complex. Um, they, some of the, Uh, members of these organizations had very strong government ties.

[00:05:32] Kazushi: For example, um, uh, Edwin, Edwin Reischauer, who was one of the leading, um, members of the National Committee, uh, used to be the U. S. Ambassador to Japan and had a very strong tie to the Johnson administration. So it gave these organizations a certain level of legitimacy and they could use these ties to the government to lobby the Johnson administration as well.

[00:05:58] Benjamin: So this is starting [00:06:00] under Lyndon Johnson and uh, is it something? That accelerates with Nixon’s, uh, administration.

[00:06:07] Kazushi: Yeah, exactly. So, um, it all started on the backdrop of, uh, the U S war in Vietnam. Um, in 1965, 66, um, a lot of people, a lot of American citizens started to question US policy in Asia, particularly Vietnam, uh, but also on China.

[00:06:27] Kazushi: Because the U. S. Policy tower China at the time was so called containment and isolation, which meant that basically ignored the existence of China, the People’s Republic of China and recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan. A lot of people started to say, you know, this this won’t work. We should recognize the existence of China in order to think about, uh, reasonable policy toward that country.

[00:06:52] Kazushi: And they funded, uh, this organization as part of, uh, uh, these efforts.

[00:06:58] Benjamin: And is this a new thing in foreign [00:07:00] relations? Having sort of state related non government actors, uh, actively involved?

[00:07:08] Kazushi: Uh, no, it’s not. Uh, you know, the United States had been mobilizing a lot of organizations and individuals with, uh, varying, um, varying levels of government ties, uh, in order to advance its interests abroad.

[00:07:27] Kazushi: I can’t really pinpoint the genesis of this, um, but, uh, you know, starting with the missionary diplomacy in the late 19th century, early 20th century. Um, so this is not something new, but this is new in the context of US China relations. During the Cold War, because, uh, the separation, the mutual isolation between the two countries, uh, in the 1950s and the early 60s was just so deep that, uh, only, only a few people penetrated, uh, the Iron Wall.

[00:07:57] Benjamin: We’ve talked about how the Vietnam War and the [00:08:00] social, um, conflict in America is feeding into this. How does the Cultural Revolution feed into it on the Chinese side?

[00:08:09] Kazushi: So that’s the most important aspect of this book, really, um, how the prolonged end of the cultural revolution affected, uh, the people to people exchanges.

[00:08:19] Kazushi: During the peak years of the cultural revolution from 1966 to 69, there was a tremendous anti American sentiments in China. Red girls would, uh, avow to fight the Americans in Vietnam if they were allowed to. And some of the high school red girls would travel all the way to Guangxi province. During the peak years of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 69, there was a tremendous anti American sentiment.

[00:08:51] Kazushi: Starting in 1969, uh, the Cultural Revolution, uh, the revolutionary, um, fervor in China subsides, [00:09:00] um, uh, started to subside, uh, gradually. And in the late 1970s, we see, uh, the beginning of the so called reform and opening up. So this transition in China from the cultural revolution and reform and opening up was brought about a huge social, uh, changes and conflicts in all corners of society, um, including trade.

[00:09:25] Kazushi: education, and even sport. So these ideological changes in different parts of different segments of the society, um, had huge impact on how China perceived the United States and how Chinese people perceive the United States and how the people to people exchanges with the United States, uh, were run by the Chinese and the Americans.

[00:09:46] Benjamin: So I’m curious to see how this plays out. On the ground. So you’ve got a bunch of Americans. They get on a plane in L. A. or San Francisco. They fly over China. What happens next?

[00:09:58] Kazushi: So, um, it really [00:10:00] depends on the specific area that we’re talking about. But, uh, usually they were, um, organized into tourist groups, uh, and, and they were, uh, shepherded, uh, to the places and sites that the Chinese wanted to show to the Americans.

[00:10:20] Kazushi: So the model. Model hospital model communes model factories model prisons even, um, in order to nurture a positive impressions on China, I know to secure positive impressions on China among these Americans. Um, so that. That’s what was happening on the surface level. If you look at Chinese government documents, if you look at local documents, I’ve been to, um, eight, nine, uh, local archives in China.

[00:10:54] Kazushi: And, um, if you read documents in these archives, there are a lot of [00:11:00] things that were happening at the local level that kind of defy the government. Instructions. So for example, uh, if you look at tourism. So the Chinese were instructed to promote Maoist ideology for the American visitors, right? Uh, in order to, um, kind of cultivate, um, a fan base in the United States for Maoism.

[00:11:22] Kazushi: Um, but if you, if you look at local governments, uh, local government offices were concerned by the local, uh, tour guides who, uh, instead of following the government instructions, uh, Just a hundred percent focused on making pocket money out of these rich American tourists.

[00:11:41] Benjamin: So you’re getting into local collections, local libraries, and finding a wealth of documents that have been, uh, not widely used.

[00:11:52] Benjamin: Uh, what was that process like going into those libraries, talking with those archivists, dealing with those documents? [00:12:00]

[00:12:00] Kazushi: Yeah, I mean, on the U. S. side, it’s just straightforward, right? On the Chinese side, it was a very, very straightforward process. pain painstaking process. Um, you know, um, in a Chinese archives, photography is prohibited anywhere.

[00:12:14] Kazushi: So, um, you have to transcribe documents, which means that it takes time. You have to stay there for weeks. to, um, transcribe, transcribe, uh, as, as many documents as possible. Um, so that itself, uh, comes with a lot of costs and efforts. Um, but, um, as I realized, as I spent more time at local archives, local archivists would get friendlier toward me, we, you know, start to, um, chat with each other.

[00:12:47] Kazushi: Um, so that, that, that sort of, uh, human interactions, um, happened eventually. Um, Even more interesting about, um, the Chinese side of the story is Chinese archives is that, so just [00:13:00] like you mentioned, um, because, uh, it’s increasingly difficult to conduct any archival research in China. Um, a Chinese studies researchers, uh, are now, um, buying documents at flea markets in China online and offline.

[00:13:16] Kazushi: And I did that too. Um, so I spent I don’t know, thousands of dollars buying about four or five boxes of documents and I would say, um, 90, 98 percent of these documents are pure garbage, but 2%. might be useful, uh, for my research. So it’s literally needle, a needle in a haystack. Um, so this type of this, uh, methodology is called garbology, collecting, uh, information from garbage.

[00:13:48] Benjamin: I think I’ve heard from, uh, archivists, uh, 90 percent of an archive is found in 10 percent of the documents, but it seems like you’re working at 98 percent and 2%, so [00:14:00] that’s harder. Yeah, it’s more like it, yeah. So your experience at archives, um, strikes me as similar to one of these exchanges you study where there is an official, Uh, a concept of how it’s supposed to happen, and then there’s a different version of what’s happening on the ground.

[00:14:20] Benjamin: Exactly. I was also curious because I think a lot of people interested in, um, Chinese history, American U. S. relations, they have this view of China in the 60s and 70s almost as a totalitarian regime. And you seem to be describing almost some sort of micro freedom that can operate within that context.

[00:14:41] Kazushi: So, you know, what’s interesting is that whenever I talk about The book, my book in China, I sometimes get a lot of pushback from senior Chinese scholars who think that yes, China under Mao is this [00:15:00] totalitarian regime, there was no space for non government actors, there’s some truth to that, the Chinese.

[00:15:06] Kazushi: Um, non state organizations that I, uh, focus on in this, uh, in this book, uh, were more or less controlled, uh, and manipulated by the state and the party. But again, if you look at the local level, these, um, uh, groups, these individuals in China, uh, actually had some maneuvering room to pursue their own interests.

[00:15:30] Kazushi: Uh, they would, they would not. Openly defy the propaganda instructor instructions sent down by the government, they’ll still follow these things, but, um, they would secretly pursue their own interests. So you see a play between the official and the unofficial.

[00:15:50] Benjamin: You mentioned pushback you get when you present your research in China.

[00:15:53] Benjamin: What sort of pushback do you get in America?

[00:15:57] Kazushi: Um, well, some people, [00:16:00] uh, think that people to people exchanges, cultural exchanges, these types of things, non governmental, uh, exchanges do not matter in your China relations. What matters in your China relations is. The power play power, you know, geopolitics between the two countries.

[00:16:17] Kazushi: And they would point to, um, Trump, Xi Jinping, the trade war, um, et cetera, et cetera, that Taiwan’s trade crisis, et cetera, et cetera. So they do not recognize the historical agency of the people. They think that the American and Chinese people were. Passive, uh, object of government manipulation. Uh, they do not exercise their own agency.

[00:16:41] Kazushi: Um, and I tried to change that perception in this book.

[00:16:45] Benjamin: So fast forward to today, U. S. Chinese relations are in a bad state. What is the legacy of people’s diplomacy? And where do you see that kind of people’s agency today? [00:17:00]

[00:17:01] Kazushi: So people’s diplomacy changed the substance of China’s US China relations. It used to be only the relationship between the two governments, but by the end of the 1970s, you see myriad relationships between the two countries, economic, educational, cultural, and so on.

[00:17:19] Kazushi: And these, um, these ties maintained US China relations since then. including, um, some really difficult periods. Uh, for example, right after the Tiananmen Square Massacre, uh, the US China relations, um, uh, uh, was almost at the point of complete breakdown. Uh, they, uh, did not have any official, uh, exchanges for many months.

[00:17:48] Kazushi: And how did they restore their relationship. They used people’s diplomacy. They used non state actors to restore their relationship. And so [00:18:00] I would say that people’s diplomacy gave birth to this notion of engagement, which is the idea that United States and China can Have, um, many things to disagree with, but still, uh, stay engaged, uh, in order to affect the future course of each nation, uh, and, you know, as, as all of us know, um, the, the idea of engagement is under heavy fire.

[00:18:26] Kazushi: Now, uh, many politicians in Washington are toying with the notion of decoupling. Uh, but, uh, engagement is not a policy created by, uh, policymakers. It’s an idea nurtured and sustained. Uh, by the people, uh, that I focus on in this book. So, um, I would say as long as the American people and Chinese people, uh, still have, uh, this idea, uh, I think, you know, um, well, the Washington and Beijing can, uh, [00:19:00] sometimes crush with each other, uh, but these different ties would still, uh, maintain US China relations.

[00:19:08] Benjamin: Well, this has been a wonderful conversation, Kazushi. Thank you so much for joining us.

[00:19:13] Kazushi: Thank you, Ben.

[00:19:15] Benjamin: 15 Minute History is produced at the University of Texas at Austin in partnership with Not Even Past and Hemispheres in the College of Liberal Arts. It is recorded at the Leitz Development Studio.

[00:19:26] Benjamin: Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts, follow us on social media, and visit our website for more information and resources. See y’all next week.